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Since the work of Casasanto (2009), it is now well established that valence and laterality
are associated. Participants tend to prefer objects presented on their dominant side over
items presented on their non-dominant side, and to place good items on their dominant
side and bad items on the other side. Several studies highlight that those associations
of valence and laterality are accounted for by the greater motor fluency of the dominant
hand and various studies noted that these associations could be reversed depending
on the way people interact with their environment. Consistently with the Theory of Event
Coding, the aim of this work is to show that the consequences of motor actions could
also reverse the associations between valence and laterality. Thus, if participants had
to place two animals (one good, one bad) on two supports, one stable (no risk of
falling), one unstable (risk of falling), we hypothesized that the good item would be
placed on the stable support, regardless of the side where it would be put (i.e., on the
dominant or non-dominant side). We expected the opposite for the bad item. The results
of two experiments are consistent with this prediction and support the claim that the
consequences of motor action bias the hedonic connotation of our dominant side.
Keywords: Body-Specificity Hypothesis, motor fluency, valence-laterality associations, event coding,
consequences of actions
Introduction
In various languages and cultures, phrases and idioms express a link between valence and horizon-
tal space: to be someone’s right hand, to have two left feet. . . In all these expressions, good things
tend to be associated with the right side and bad things with the left side.
According to Casasanto’s Body-Specificity Hypothesis (2009, 2011), the way we interact with our
environment participates in our conceptualization of concepts and meaning. For instance, valence
is associated with horizontal space because of the motor fluency by which one acts with one’s dom-
inant hand (i.e., the association valence-laterality). Indeed, one of our main body specificities is our
handedness. Right- and left-handers act differently in their environment, and experience fluency
from opposed movements: our most fluent actions are those carried out by our dominant hand,
and on our dominant side.
Various researches have shown that motor fluency is associated with a hedonic conno-
tation, such as fluent actions are positively connoted compared with a less or non-fluent
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action (Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001;
Winkielman et al., 2003; Hayes et al., 2008; Brouillet et al., 2011;
de la Vega et al., 2012).
However Casasanto and Chrysikou (2011, Experiment 2)
highlighted that the association valence-laterality could be
reversed by short-term changes in the way one interact with its
environment (i.e., participants manipulated dominos while wear-
ing a bulky ski glove on their dominant hand). The aim of this
work is to show that the consequences of motor actions could
also reverse the associations between valence and laterality.
Indeed, since James’s (1890) ideomotor theory, it is known that
learning establishes direct and automatic links between actions
and the perceptual results they generate (for a review, see Stock
and Stock, 2004; Shin et al., 2010). In other words, action exe-
cution is triggered by a stimulus, and is necessarily followed
by a feedback, which is a function of this action (action effect,
Hommel, 1996, 2013; Prinz, 1997). In line with the ideomotor
theory (James, 1890), the Theory of Event Coding (i.e., TEC,
Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001) considers that action and its
effects constitute one and the same event. In this line, Brouil-
let et al. (2014) could show that sensory-motor consequences of
past actions form part of the memory trace components cued by
a current action.
The purpose of this research is to test the hypothesis that the
hedonic connotation of the action performed with our dominant
hand on our dominant side (i.e., motor fluency) is relative to the
consequences of this action. If the consequences of this action are
detrimental to the object be placed (e.g., fall risk), we can assume
that the association “right space—positive valence” will not occur.
Valence and Laterality
Casasanto (2009) conducted the first study that directly tested
the associations on valence and laterality. In their first experi-
ment, participants were presented with a character named Bob
that was supposed to like pandas and thought they were good,
and to dislike zebras, thinking they were bad. Participants had to
place those two animals into two boxes presented on the left and
on the right parts of a piece of paper. The main result obtained by
Casasanto is that right-handers tended to place the good panda
in the right box, and the bad zebra in the left box, while a major-
ity of left-handers placed the good panda on the left box, and
the bad zebra on the right one (Casasanto, 2009, Experiment
1). Identical results were found when Bob was supposed to like
zebras, and to dislike pandas. In following experiments, partici-
pants tended to prefer the product, person or creature presented
on their dominant side to the items presented on their non-
dominant side (Casasanto, 2009, Experiments 3–5). For example
when facing two alien creatures placed on either side of a piece
of paper and having to choose which of them looks the most
intelligent, funny or honest, participants tended to choose the
one situated on their dominant side (Casasanto, 2009, Exper-
iment 4). Simple observations of hand gestures during speech
highlight similar combinations of valence and side, depending on
the orator’s handedness: during the campaigns for the U.S. presi-
dential election, Casasanto and Jasmin (2010) identified different
gestures during positive and negative speeches, depending on
the candidates’ dominant hand: right-handed candidates (Bush
and Kerry) used their right hand during positively connoted
speeches, and their left-hand during negatively connoted dis-
courses, while left-handed candidates (Obama andMcCain) used
their left hand for positive speeches and their right-hand for
negative ones.
These spontaneous associations of positive valence with the
dominant side seem to be rather robust since they have been
demonstrated in children as young as 5 years old (Casasanto and
Henetz, 2012) and in various cultures (de la Fuente et al., 2014).
Furthermore, they affect people’s memory as well as their judg-
ments: Brunyé et al. (2012) showed participants a map featur-
ing the positions of fictitious positive and negative events. Later,
participants had to recall those locations on the map. Results
demonstrated memory biases dependent on the valence of the
event and on the handedness of the participants: right-handers
tended to locate positive events too far to the right and negative
events too far to the left, whereas left-handers showed opposite
biases.
These studies focused on the spontaneous associations of
valence and laterality. Recently, the question was raised of
whether those associations could affect response times in a
valence judgment task manipulating the compatibility between
valence and response hand. de la Vega et al. (2012) tested right-
handers and left-handers using a valence judgment task of emo-
tional words. Participants were asked to respond with both hands
(i.e., dominant and non-dominant) by pressing response keys
located respectively on the left and on the right-hand side of a
keyboard, corresponding to either a positive or negative response
(the position of each valence was reversed in the second part
of the experiment). Their results showed compatibility effects:
both right- and left-handers responded faster with their domi-
nant hand to positive words than to negative words (see Kong,
2013, for similar results on evaluation of faces).
One experiment has focused on the effect of the lateral posi-
tion of the positive and negative responses on the evaluation
of neutral words. Milhau et al. (2013) showed that in a valence
judgment task the way positive and negative labels are presented
on each side of a horizontal scale has an impact on judgment:
right-handers’ evaluations are more positive on a scale associ-
ating positive to the right and negative to the left (congruently
with Casasanto’s associations of valence and laterality in right-
handers) than on the reversed scale, especially after the carrying
out of a fluent movement of the right hand.
Since those associations of valence and laterality are explained
on the basis of manual dominance, one could expect that these
links are fixed and constant. Yet, Casasanto andChrysikou (2011)
noted that these associations could be reversed by both long-
term and short-term changes in the way one interacts with its
environment. In a first experiment, stroke-induced hemiplegic
patients were asked to perform an oral version of the good/bad
animals experiment conducted by Casasanto (2009). In the sec-
ond experiment, the authors used a simple motor task requir-
ing the two hands (manipulating dominos), and temporarily
disabled right-handers and left-handers’ dominant hand with a
bulky ski glove, leaving their non-dominant hand more efficient
for task performance. Results showed that right-handers para-
lyzed (Experiment 1) or virtually disabled (Experiment 2) on the
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right side tended to manifest valence/laterality associations usu-
ally encountered in left-handers, specifically to associate positive
with the left and negative with the right. Similarly, left-handed
patients paralyzed/disabled on the left side manifested right-
handers’ valence/laterality mapping: positive on the right and
negative on the left (Casasanto and Chrysikou, 2011). These
results confirmed that modifications in the way people interact
with their environment (even at very short-term) modify their
motor fluency and therefore their valence/laterality associations.
Similarly, Milhau et al. (2014) showed that in a valence judg-
ment task, right-handers and left-handers manifest the same
pattern of compatibility effects when using the same hand of
response. In a valence judgment task of positive and negative
words, participants responded with lateralized actions of either
their dominant or non-dominant hand. Results highlighted that
for both right- and left-handers, when the location of responses
was congruent with the fluency of the responding hand (for the
right hand: negative/left and positive/right; for the left hand: pos-
itive/left and negative/right), response times to positive evalu-
ations were shorter than for negative evaluations. Conversely,
when the location of responses was non-congruent with the flu-
ency of the responding hand, we observed faster responses for
negative evaluations than for positive evaluations.
These studies support an account of the associations of valence
and laterality based on motor fluency and not only in terms
of handedness. It is not always the dominant side that is posi-
tively connoted, but the side of the most fluent action. A recent
experiment by de la Vega et al. (2013) confirms this explana-
tion, demonstrating that the compatibility effects of valence and
laterality in a valence judgment task are based on the response
hand, and not on the response side: dominant-hand responses
are facilitated for positive evaluations, even when the responses
are located on the non-dominant side.
From these last experiments motor fluency seems to be the
key factor to explain hedonic connotation linked to action. How-
ever, it appears that all these studies overlooked a crucial aspect
of action: each action is followed by consequences. The status
of action in these experiments is only a response to a stimulus,
the command you run to respond to the task. Yet, in real life,
an action is not only an output of the system, it is also informa-
tive of the consequences associated for the person performing it
(see above ideomotor theory and TEC). For example, Anelli et al.
(2012) show that if generally graspable objects activate a facili-
tating motor response, dangerous objects do not. Our objective is
therefore to take into account the impact of action’s consequences
on the link between horizontal space and valence.
Experiment 1
Overview
Our objective in this experiment was to determine whether asso-
ciations between valence and horizontal space in right-handed
participants are influenced by the consequences of the partici-
pants’ actions.
We first intended to replicate Casasanto’s (2009) classic result
that right-handers tend to associate good with right and bad
with left (Experiment 1a). Then we tested whether these classical
associations would appear with our specific response device
(Experiment 1b). Finally, our last and main objective was to
determine the impact of action consequences on these associa-
tions, by manipulating the risk associated with the result of an
action (Experiments 1c and 1d).
In four declinations of the experiment, participants were pre-
sented with two figurines of animals (one presented as good
and the other as bad, see Supplementary Material), and were
instructed to place, with their right hand, each of them on one
of two small planks situated on the participant’s left and right-
hand side (see Supplementary Material). In Experiment 1a, the
two small planks were laid flat on the table. In Experiment 1b, the
two small planks were placed in stable equilibrium on a wood
lath. In Experiment 1c, the small plank on the right side was
placed precariously on a wood lath and was in unstable equilib-
rium, while the plank on the left side stood stable. In Experiment
1d, the small plank on the left side was placed precariously on a
wood lath and was in instable equilibrium, while the plank on the
right side stood stable. Thus, in Experiments 1c and 1d putting
the animal on the instable small plank would result in the animal
falling.
Experiment 1a
Participants
Thirty two students from Montpellier University (25 females),
all native French speakers and all right-handed, took part in this
experiment after having signed informed consent to participate
in the study.
Material
The material comprised two plastic colored animals and two
small planks.
The plastic animals were a hyena (8 cm long and 4 cm high)
and a zebra (8 cm long and 6 cm high).We chose these two plastic
animals because they were equally long (this feature is important
for the position of each animal on the small plank). A black mark,
like an inverted triangle, was painted on the belly of the animal
that referred to the middle. A pre-test on 50 persons determined
that the hyena was negatively valenced and the zebra positively
valenced.
The two small planks were 15 cm long, 3 cm wide and 1 cm
deep. A white point with a diameter of 0.5 cm was painted on the
middle of the long face of each small plank. This point indicated
where participants had to put each animal.
Procedure
Participants sat at a table with the experimenter sitting in front of
them. A box containing the material was placed on a chair next to
the experimenter, so that participants could not see the material
before the experimenter presented them with it. A sheet of stiff
paper was placed on the table (80 cm long and 50 cm wide), the
bottom edge aligned with the edge of the table. Two crosses were
horizontally aligned and drawn 50 cm apart on the paper sheet.
Each cross was positioned 15 cm from the right or left edge of the
sheet. This device allowed for similar conditions of presentation
among participants.
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FIGURE 1 | Proportion of participants who placed the good animal on
the small planks on the left and on the right. Note that in Experiment 1c
the animal placed on the plank on the right hand side fell, while in Experiment
1d the animal placed on the plank on the left hand side fell. In Experiments 1a
and 1b the animals could not fall.
Each participant was tested individually in an isolated room
by a single experimenter. Each experiment started with a
brief presentation of the upcoming task; participants indicated
whether they agreed to participate or not. Upon their approval,
the experiment started.
The experiment consisted in only one trial. The experimenter
took out the two animals in one hand. He asked the partici-
pants to reach out their left hand and deposited the two animals
together. He asked them to put their hands onto their knees
until further instructions. This procedure was meant to avoid
presenting an animal before the other, thus inducing a pref-
erential choice. Once the participant’s hand was on his knees,
the experimenter took out the wooden planks and placed them
one on each cross. Participants were then asked to place, with
their right hand, the good zebra on one of the two small planks
laid on the table and the bad hyena on the other by match-
ing the mark on the animal’s belly with the white point on the
small plank. As in Casasanto (2009), the order in which par-
ticipants were instructed to place the good and bad animals
was counterbalanced, to ensure that any associations between
space and valence in participants’ judgments were not con-
founded with associations between the side of space and the
temporal order in which they placed the animals (16 partici-
pants were instructed for good animal first and 16 for bad animal
first).
Results and Discussion
When asked to freely place a good animal and a bad animal on
their left and right side, a majority (78%) of our right-handed par-
ticipants placed the good animal on the small plank on the right,
and the bad one on the small plank on the left (sign test on 25 vs.
7, Z = 4.00, p < 0.01, see Figure 1).
These results replicate Casasanto’s (2009) classic effect that
people tend to place positive items on their dominant side, and
bad items on their non-dominant side.
Our effect is consistent with the Good is Right association usu-
ally found in right-handers (Casasanto, 2009; de la Vega et al.,
2012; Milhau et al., 2013, 2014). The following experiment will
try to extend this effect to our specific device.
Experiment 1b
Participants
Thirty two students from Montpellier University (23 females)
that did not participate in Experiment 1a took part in this experi-
ment. They were all native French speakers and all right-handed,
and signed informed consent to participate in the study.
Material
The material was the same as in Experiment 1a, except that the
small planks had a black mark, like an inverted triangle, painted
in the middle of the edge of the plank. We also used two wood
laths that were 10 cm long, 3 cm large and 3 cm deep. A black
triangle was painted at the end of the wood laths, on their edges.
Procedure
The procedure was very similar to Experiment 1a, except that
here the experimenter first took out the two wood laths and
placed then vertically on the crosses on the table. Then the exper-
imenter took out one center-marked small plank and asked par-
ticipants to put it on the wood lath on the right by matching the
mark of the small plank with the mark of the wood lath. When
the small plank was placed the experimenter took out the other
center-marked small plank and asked participants to put it on the
wood lath on the left by matching the mark of the small plank
with themark of the wood lath. After thesemanipulations the two
small planks were in stable equilibrium on the twowood laths and
did not present any risk. Participants were then asked to place,
with their right hand, the two animals on each of the two small
planks. The order in which participants were instructed to place
the small planks and the two animals was counterbalanced.
Results and Discussion
When asked to freely place a good animal and a bad animal on
their left and right sides on stable planks, a majority (69%) of our
right-handed participants placed the good animal on the small
plank on the right, and the bad one on the small plank on the left
(sign test on 22 vs. 10, Z = 3.17, p < 0.01, see Figure 1).
These results replicate both Casasanto’s effect (2009) and our
results in Experiment 1a.
It confirms that our device with planks in equilibrium is ade-
quate to further explore the associations of valence and laterality.
Our objective in Experiments 1c and 1d is now to explore the
impact of action consequences on these associations.
Experiment 1c
Participants
Thirty two students from Montpellier University (26 females)
that did not participate in Experiments 1a and 1b took part in
this experiment. They were all native French speakers and all
right-handed, and signed informed consent to participate in the
study.
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Material
The material was the same as in Experiment 1b, except that one
small plank had a blackmark painted on themiddle of the edge of
the plank (center-marked) while the other plank had a blackmark
painted at 5 cm from the left edge of the plank (left-marked). We
also used two wood laths that were 10 cm long, 3 cm large, and
3 cm deep. A black triangle was painted at the end of the wood
laths, on the edge.
Procedure
The procedure was very similar from Experiment 1b, except that
here participant were instructed to place the left-marked plank
on the wood lath on the right, matching the mark on the small
plank with themark on the wood lath. Thematching of themarks
resulted in the small plank being in instable equilibrium on the
wood lath. Note that by placing the small plank participants expe-
rienced the instability and therefore the fact that an object placed
on it would fall systematically from the structure. When the small
plank was placed, the experimenter took out the center-marked
small plank and asked participants to put it on the wood lath on
the left by matching the mark of the small plank with the mark of
the wood lath. In this case the small plank was in stable equilib-
rium on the wood lath. Participants had to place, with their right
hand, one animal on each plank.
Results and Discussion
Contrary to our previous results and consistently with our pre-
dictions, a majority (69%) of our right-handed participants chose
to place the good animal on the small plank on the left and the
bad animal on the plank on the right (sign test on 22 vs. 10,
Z = 3.17, p < 0.01 (see Figure 1).
This result indicates an inversion of right-handers’ usual asso-
ciations, and highlights that participants took into account the
consequences of their action. Because the animal placed on the
unstable plank on the right would fall, participants mostly chose
not to place the good animal on it, and to place it on the stable
(“safe”) plank, rather, even if it was on the left side.
Experiment 1d
Participants
Thirty-two students from Montpellier University (25 females)
that did not participate in previous experiments took part in
this experiment. They were all native French speakers and all
right-handed, and signed informed consent to participate in the
study.
Material
The material was the same as in Experiment 1c, except that one
small plank had a black mark painted in the middle of the edge of
the plank (center-marked) while the other plank had a blackmark
painted 5 cm from the right edge of the plank (right-marked).We
also used two wood laths that were 10 cm long, 3 cm large, and
3 cm deep. A black triangle was painted at the end of the wood
laths, on their edges.
Procedure
The procedure was very similar from Experiment 1c, except that
here the unstable equilibrium plank was on the wood lath on the
left, and the stable plank was on the wood lath on the right. Par-
ticipants had to place, with their right hand, one animal on each
plank. Note that the animal placed on the plank on the left hand
side fell systematically from the structure.
Results and Discussion
The pattern of result in this fourth experiment is in line with
those of Experiments 1a and 1b and is the exact opposite of the
pattern in Experiment 1d. A majority (81%) of our right-handed
participants chose to place the good animal on the small plank on
the right and the bad animal on the plank on the left (sign test on
26 vs. 6, Z = 4.24, p < 0.01, see Figure 1).
When it was the plank on the left that fell, participants had
no problem assigning it to the bad animal. Their choices conse-
quently reflect their typical associations of valence and laterality,
linking good with right and bad with left.
Conclusion of Experiment 1
The aim of this experiment was to test associations between
valence and horizontal space in right-handed participants to
determine whether these associations were influenced by the
consequences of participants’ actions.
Usually right-handers tend to associate positive to their right
part of space and negative to their left part (Casasanto, 2009; de la
Vega et al., 2012), because of the greater ease of their interaction
with the word with their dominant right hand (motor fluency, for
extended explanation see Milhau et al., 2014).
Experiment 1a allowed us to replicate these associations when
we manipulated only the animal affective trait and the position of
the planks. In this situation the action of placing each animal on
the plank did not have any overt consequence, and right-handers
mostly placed the good animal on the plank on the right and the
bad animal on the plank on the left (see Figure 1).
In Experiment 1b the consequences of the participants’ actions
were limited: placing the animal on the planks was not likely to
make it fall, whether it was placed on the right-hand-side plank or
on the left-hand-side plank. This situation therefore did not dif-
fer significantly from the one in Experiment 1a, and we observed
a similar pattern of response: good is right.
Our main hypothesis was that an overt “bad” consequence of
action would impact participants’ choices in this task. In Experi-
ments 1c and 1d we modified the task so that one of the response
choices would induce a risk for the animal: by making one of the
planks unstable, one of the animals fell from the plank when the
participant put it on it.
Our main result in Experiment 1 is the demonstration of
the inversion of responses in Experiment 1c. When the unsta-
ble small plank was on the right side, participants did not choose
to place the good animal on it as right-handers had done in the
previous experiments. In contrast they largely preferred to place
the bad animal on it, as if they were trying to “protect” the good
animal from the risk of falling.
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Experiment 1d confirmed this interpretation since when the
unstable plank was on the left, right-handers mostly chose to
place the bad animal on it, manifesting in their turn the usual
associations according to which good is right, bad is left.
To test the validity of our interpretation in terms of “trying
to protect the good animal from the risk of falling”, we con-
ducted a second experiment in which in a first phase the action of
placing the good animal on the plank did not have overt conse-
quence (i.e., similar to Experiment 1a), but in a second phase the
action of placing the animal could have dramatic consequences
(i.e., similar to Experiment 1c). In other words we wanted to see
if after placing the good animal on the right, participants were
able to change their choice when their action could have bad
consequences for it (i.e., the risk of falling).
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was composed of two declinations that differed
only in the second phase. In the shared first phase the two small
planks were laid on the table, one on the right side and one on the
left side of the participants. During the second phase the small
planks were placed on the top of a wood lath. In Experiment 2a
one of the small plank was in stable equilibrium on the wood lath
on the right and the other in instable equilibrium on the wood
lath on the left. In Experiment 2b one of the small planks was in
instable equilibrium on the wood lath on the right and the other
in stable equilibrium on the wood lath on the left.
Experiment 2a
Participants
Thirty-two students from Montpellier University (22 females),
all native French speakers and all right-handed, took part in this
experiment after having signed informed consent to participate
in the study.
Material
The material was the same as in Experiment 1a and in Experi-
ment 1c.
Procedure
Participants were not informed that they would have to place ani-
mals on the two small planks two times in a row. The procedure
for the first placement was very similar from Experiment 1a, with
the two small planks posed directly on the table. The procedure
for the second placement was very similar from Experiment 1d:
the two small planks were in equilibrium on the wood lath the one
on the right being stable and the one on the left being unstable.
Results and Discussion
The results of the first placement show that a majority (75%)
of our right-handed participants placed the good animal on the
small plank on the right, and the bad one on the small plank on
the left (sign test on 24 vs. 8, Z = 3.75, p < 0.01, see Figure 2).
The results of the second placement show that a majority
(81%) of our right-handed participants chose to place the good
animal on the small plank on the right and the bad animal on the
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Condion 1
Condion 2
Le!
Right
FIGURE 2 | Proportion of participants who placed the good animal on
the planks on the left and on the right. Note that in condition 1 the animals
could not fall but in condition 2 the animal placed on the left plank fell.
plank on the left (sign test on 26 vs. 6, Z = 4.24, p < 0.01, see
Figure 2).
The results are consistent with those obtained in Experiments
1a and 1d. When asked to freely place a good animal and a bad
animal on their left and right sides, participants placed the good
animal on the small plank on the right, and the bad one on the
small plank on the left. Their choices were similar in both phases,
showing that the risk of falling associated to the left plank did not
impact their responses.
Experiment 2b
Participants
Thirty-two students from Montpellier University (26 females),
all native French speakers and all right-handed, took part in this
experiment after having signed informed consent to participate
in the study.
Material
The material was the same as in Experiment 2a.
Procedure
Participants were not informed that they would have to place ani-
mals on the two small planks two times in a row. The procedure
for the first placement was very similar to that in Experiment 1a,
with the two small planks laid directly on the table. The proce-
dure for the second placement was very similar from Experiment
1c: the two small planks were in equilibrium on the wood lath
the one on the right being unstable and the one on the left being
stable.
Results and Discussion
The results of the first placement show that a majority (78%)
of our right-handed participants placed the good animal on the
small plank on the right, and the bad one on the small plank on
the left (sign test on 25 vs. 7, Z = 4.00, p < 0.01, see Figure 3).
The results of the second placement show that a majority
(72%) of our right-handed participants chose to place the good
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FIGURE 3 | Proportion of participants who placed the good animal on
the small planks on the left and on the right. Note that in condition 1 the
animals could not fall but in condition 2 the animal placed on the right plank fell.
animal on the small plank on the left and the bad animal on the
plank on the right (sign test on 23 vs. 9, Z = 3.47, p < 0.01, see
Figure 3).
The results are consistent with those obtained in Experiments
1a and 1c. When asked to freely place a good animal and a bad
animal on safe small planks laid on their left and right sides, par-
ticipants placed the good animal on the small plank on the right,
and the bad one on the small plank on the left. But when the small
plank on the right would fall, participants reversed their previ-
ous placement, and chose not to place the good animal on it but
rather to place it on the safety plank (stable), even if it was on the
left side.
Conclusion of Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 1 was to test whether the associations
between valence and horizontal space in right-handed partici-
pants, are influenced by the consequences of participants’ actions.
Results of Experiment 1c highlight that when the unstable plank
was on the right side, participants preferred to place the bad ani-
mal on it, as if they were trying to “protect” the good animal from
the risk of falling.
The aim of this Experiment 2 was to test this interpretation.
The results highlight that, even if in a first phase participants
placed spontaneously the good animal on the right side, when the
unstable plank was on the right side, participants did not choose
to place the good animal on it. In contrast they largely preferred
to place it on the left side. These results support our hypoth-
esis that an overt “bad” consequence of action would impact
participants’ choices.
General Discussion
The Body-Specificity Hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009, 2011) suggests
that the body and the way one uses it shape one’s thoughts.
This proposition has been tested by comparing right- and left-
handers’ emotional judgment. Because of handedness, people
experience horizontal space differently: they act more easily with
their dominant hand, that is to say more fluently. Since motor
fluency is associated with hedonic connotation, a fluent move-
ment being ascribed a positive connotation (Hayes et al., 2008),
people tend to associate positive valence with the dominant side:
right is good and left is bad for a right-hander, the reverse for
a left-hander (Casasanto and Henetz, 2012; de la Vega et al.,
2012, 2013; Kong, 2013; de la Fuente et al., 2014; Milhau et al.,
2014). Nonetheless Casasanto and Chrysikou (2011) showed that
variations in the way people interact with their environment
modify their valence—laterality associations. Moreover, Milhau
et al. (2013) showed that the location of responses interacts with
the fluency of the responding hand. Thus, these studies high-
light that the valence-laterality association is supported by motor
fluency more than handedness. It is not always the dominant
side that is positively connoted, but the side of the most fluent
action.
Here we considered that these last studies overlooked a cru-
cial aspect of action: each action is followed by consequences.
As supported by the ideomotor theory (James, 1890) or the
Theory of Event Coding (Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001),
action and its effects constitute one and the same event. There-
fore, the aim of this article was to take into account the
impact of action’s consequences on the link between valence and
laterality.
Our experiments are inspired by Casasanto’s (2009) classic
paradigm. Participants were presented two figurines of animals
(one presented as good and the other as bad), and were instructed
to place each of them on one of two small planks situated on the
participant’s left and right-hand side. These small planks were
either laid flat on the table or the participants had first to place
them on wood laths. In this case the small planks were in stable
or unstable equilibrium.
The main result in Experiment 1 is that when the unstable
small plank was on the right side, participants did not choose to
place the good animal on it. In contrast they largely preferred to
place the good animal on the left side on the stable small plank,
as if they were trying to protect the good animal from the risk of
falling.
The results of Experiment 2 highlight that, even if the partici-
pants spontaneously placed the good animal on the right when
the device was safe, they changed their responses when it was
made dangerous (i.e., risk of falling): they did not put the good
animal on the risky right side but preferred to put it on the left
side, in a safer place.
Taken together, these results support our hypothesis that the
hedonic connotation associated to the fluency linked to dom-
inant hand and dominant side is relative to the consequences
of the actions performed. The classic association “right space—
positive valence” for a right-hander did not occur if the action
performed could have negative consequences (e.g., fall risk).
In other words, right is good if right is safe. But, the experi-
ence should be replicated with left-handers for the results to be
generalizable.
To conclude, the originality of this work lies in three points.
First, it is to our knowledge the first study that shows that the con-
sequences of an action modify emotional judgments and reverse
the valence—space associations. This result provides additional
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support to the claim that the compatibility effects of valence
and laterality in a valence judgment task are based on the flu-
ency of the response hand, and not on the response side: this is
true despite the consequences of the action performed. Second,
the perception of a situation is underpinned by the activation of
the perceptual outcome of action, that is to say the action per-
formed and its consequences. Consequently, the judgment on
an object that appears in this situation and the action to per-
formwith it are dependent on this perceptual outcome. Third, we
have created an original paradigm that simulates what happens
in real life: actions are always followed by an informative feed-
back. Indeed, the functional characteristics are crucial to define a
fluent action (i.e., effector and orientation, for example the dom-
inant hand acting in the dominant side), but in order to adapt to
the situation at hand; cognition has to take into account action’s
consequences.
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